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Abstract 
The aim of this study is to examine the association of fiscal decentralization in relation to government size in 
Indonesia. Literature theory of leviathan model argued that government behavior tends to maximize their 
revenue and expand their spending (government size). The constitutional way to hamper this behavior is 
limitation access of central government to revenue and giving revenue authorization to sub national government. 
Panel data of 33 provinces in Indonesia are deployed to examine the association of fiscal decentralization and 
government size. Proxies of fiscal decentralization are, local tax revenue, usher charge, decentralization revenue 
and government transfer. The empirical evidence in this study support previous study of leviathan hypothesis 
that fiscal decentralization tend to decrease government size.      
Keywords: fiscal decentralization, government size, leviathan hypothesis.    
 
1. Introduction 
Fiscal decentralization is believed could increase quality and efficiency of public goods provision to the 
consumers-voters. Mechanism of fiscal decentralization gives an authority to different level of government 
where they are free to decide their revenue and expenditure policy. Local government given authorization to 
determine the prioritize list of public goods to be serve that appropriate match or close to their need. Instead of 
expenditure authorization, tax devolution is also given to local government. Under centralizing tax system 
argued that voters spread in several location will hide their obligation and central government tend to prioritize 
their interest, expand their spending and lead to increase government size. Limitation access of central 
government to tax and fiscal instrument believed could hamper government size. Tax authorization to each sub 
central government make each jurisdiction compete on tax rate and this access make them wise on using 
spending and finally this is will reduce government size.  
Study related to fiscal decentralization and government or public sector size still relevant to explore 
today event there are vast and varies studies conducted to this concept. Several countries especially developing 
countries adopt fiscal decentralization that change and reform fiscal policy between central and sub central 
government. The pioneering and later become main reference studies is done by Brennan & Buchanan (1980). 
This study more known as Leviathan hypothesis, posit that government intervention in the economic should be 
less, ceteris paribus, the grater to extent to which taxes and expenditure are decentralize. The study also reveals 
that the main goal of decentralization is to create competition among jurisdiction, and resulting lower tax rate in 
order to attract investment in their area. Every citizen assume has easy access and free moving of their asset to 
other jurisdiction, tax rate will compete and tend to lower and finally restrain public sector size. 
Intergovernmental grant in fiscal decentralization transmission channel according to several studies, tend to 
increase government size or associated significantly positive to government expenditure, while tax income of 
local government associated significantly negative to public sector size. Fiscal decentralization in developed 
country given full responsibility to determine tax revenue and expenditure policy meanwhile in developing 
country authorization limited just to expenditure side, see Muller (2003) and Feld et al (2003). Tax assigning to 
local government in developing country like Indonesia is given limited to some type of tax object such as vehicle 
tax, hotel and restaurant tax, property tax, user charge etc. Main object tax like income tax, value added tax, and 
custom tax are not assigned to local government. In this study we try to explore whether fiscal decentralization in 
Indonesia, in term of local tax revenue supported the leviathan hypothesis. Instead of empirical studies 
supporting leviathan hypothesis, several studies have different result. Oates (1985) criticizing leviathan 
hypothesis and undertook study examine fiscal decentralization in relation to government size. The result shows 
that there is no systematic evidence between the degree of decentralization and government size. The similar 
result also shown in Nelson (1986), Forbes and Zampelli (1989), Feld, Kirchgässner and Schaltegger (2003),  
Prohl and Schneider (2009). In others side, some studies support leviathan hypothesis (Marlow, 1988), (Stein 
1999), Rodden 2003 Jin and Zou (2002) Ashworth, J., Galli, E., & Padovano, F. (2013). The transmission 
channel to measure government size is different in each study. Oates (1985), Nelson (1986), Forbes and 
Zampelli (1989), Feld, Kirchgässner and Schaltegger (2003), and Prohl and Schneider (2009) using revenue 
based to measure government size while other studies in general using expenditure basis for dependent variable. 
Government level analyzed in the study varies from local government in intra national and cross country data. 
Oates study employ data both of intra national and cross country, Feld, Kirchgässner and Schaltegger (2003) 
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deploy data from local government in Switzerland, stein (1999) on America Latin cross country. 
Revenue for local government might be acquired from internal and external fund such as local taxing, 
user charge, project of income generating, loan and intergovernmental grants. In many countries local tax 
revenue is one of the main sourcing fund instead of intergovernmental grant in fiscal decentralization mechanism. 
Indonesia that began decentralization early of 2000, funds from local tax revenue and transfer balance fund 
become the main of government fund. Table 1, describe local government revenue structure Indonesia, that 
mainly source from local taxing, balancing transfer fund, and others legal fund. Local taxing revenue is the 
biggest fund for local government followed by general allocation Fund (DAU), Tax sharing fund, others 
sourcing fund, natural resources, user charge and special allocation fund (DAK). Local taxes is comprises of 
vehicle tax, title transfer tax, restaurant and hotel tax, etc. this fund on average contribute more less 40% of total 
source fund. Tax sharing fund is tax that administered and levied by central government and retransfer again to 
each region. This sharing tax comprises of income tax (domestic and foreigner taxpayer), land and property tax, 
Land and Building Title Transfer Duty. Other Legal Revenue is other income that coming from the central 
government and or from other local government. Other revenue comprises; grants; emergency fund, which is 
fund of  the  state  budget  allocated to areas get a national disaster, extraordinary experiencing a national disaster, 
extraordinary events and/or solvency crisis; tax share from provincial and other local governments; contingency 
funds/balancing/adjustment from government; financial assistance from provincial and other local governments, 
and other legal income. 
Table 1.Structure of Local Goverment Revenue in Indonesia (percentage) 
    2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
1 Own Source Revenue 48.82 49 44.04 45.05 46.01 45.91 48.57 52.59 46.53 49.37 49.03 
Local Tax 42.61 42.54 37.07 38.48 39.34 38.09 40.5 44.83 39.24 42.27 42.15 
User Charge  2.5 2.36 2.31 2.5 1.96 1.59 1.25 1.01 1.42 0.62 1.11 
Rev from local gov enterprise 1.12 1.36 1.23 1.23 1.35 1.63 1.65 1.8 1.42 1.38 1.27 
Natural resources 2.59 2.74 3.43 2.85 3.36 4.61 5.17 4.95 4.44 5.11 4.5 
2 Transfer balance Fund 43.62 43.54 48.51 47.93 44.46 43.07 40.68 37.7 33.33 31.51 31.56 
Tax sharing rev 15.94 15.59 14.82 15.37 15.33 15.58 15.03 11.75 11.46 8.64 10.74 
Non tax Sharing rev 8.98 11.7 12.66 9.17 9.84 7.26 8.47 8.93 6.43 6.95 6.17 
General Allocation Fund 18.66 16.21 21 22.35 18.56 18.86 16.48 16.11 14.72 15.05 13.89 
Special Allocation Fund 0.04 0.05 0.03 1.05 0.73 1.38 0.7 0.91 0.72 0.86 0.76 
3 Other source Rev 7.56 7.46 7.45 7.01 9.53 11.02 10.75 9.71 20.14 19.12 19.41 
Total 1+2+3 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Ministry of Finance of RI 
The aim of this paper is to examine relationship between the fiscal decentralization proxy by local tax 
revenue, user charge, government grant, and decentralization revenue channel in conjunction to local 
government size in province level in Indonesia. We using variable of local tax revenue- property tax, user charge, 
and tax sharing in affecting local government size. Motivation of this research is the fact that local government 
Indonesia still depend on government grant besides others fund sourcing from local taxing. Most of the empirical 
study shows that local revenue in term of local taxing altered the public spending or government size. (Feld, 
Kirchgässner and Schaltegger (2003), Jin and Zou(2002), Fiva (2006).   
The rest of this paper is structured as follow; section 2 review literature reviews, section 3, describe data, 
variable and specification empirical data. Section 4 present the result of regression model, and section 5 figure 
the main conclusion. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Public provision not always fully provided by central government instead local government could provide the 
public goods such as public school, hospitals, infrastructure, fire protection. According to Tiebout (1956) at 
central level the consumer voter of public are given while at local level, they have expenditure and revenues set 
pattern more or less. Consumer voter will move to the region in which their set preferences are satisfied. Local 
government offer public goods to attracting individual reside the palace and charge tax to financing it. Brunan 
and buchanan (1977,1978, 1979, 1980) proposed the leviathan model mention that the government behavior of 
budget maximizer tent to maximize their revenue, and the constitution way to constraint the spending behavior is 
to impose taxing. Government become the only institution that has right to do monopoly. The major problem 
appears is concerning how government is to be preventing from exploiting its monopoly power. They suggest 
method that inducing leviathan behavior; each of expenditure is allotted a particular tax base that is highly 
complementary with the public good itself. Another method is assigning spending and revenue powers to the 
lower government.  
Oates (1985) found an insignificant relationship between the decentralization ratio and the size of 
government. The study used 48 cross state in United States and the second, deployed 43 countries, the regression 
result obtained that the study not found a statistically significant fiscal decentralization impact on government 
size. Jin and Zou (2001) examine the fiscal decentralization with government size using panel data regression of 
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32 industrial and developing countries. The result support leviathan hypothesis and reveal that expenditure 
decentralization leads to smaller national governments, larger sub national government. Revenue 
decentralization increases sub national government and reduces national government,  vertical imbalances tend 
to increase sub national size and also aggregate government. 
Rodden (2003) examine the effect of fiscal decentralization that it is funded by intergovernmental fund 
and local taxation, the result show that decentralization associated with smaller government expenditure and the 
growth faster when the expenditure sourcing from intergovernmental transfer. Soren (2014) examined tax under 
jurisdiction competition and reveal that fiscal federalism is negatively associated with lower government 
expenditure, but positive with the public investment. Cassette and Paty (2010) examine the fiscal 
decentralization and government size in European countries. The focus of the study was analyzing the effect 
fiscal decentralization on aggregate, national and sub national government size. They find that government 
spending changes very slowly over time, and there are some interactions in public expenditures among the EU-
15. Vertical imbalance tends to increase the sizes of sub national, national and aggregate governments. However 
they are also find that revenues decentralization reduces national government but it is increase sub national 
government size and leading to larger aggregate government size. 
Zhu, Z., & Krug, B. (2005) was testing leviathan hypothesis in China in term of vertical 
decentralization, horizontal fragmentation and intergovernmental collusion. The result demonstrate that fiscal 
decentralization curtail government size in China or supported leviathan hypothesis. Feld, L. P., Kirchgässner, G., 
& Schaltegger, C. A. (2010), analyze the effect of different federalist institutions on size and structure of 
government revenue. The results indicate that tax exporting has a revenue expanding effect whereas tax 
competition favors a smaller size of government. Fragmentation has essentially no effect on the size of 
government revenue for Swiss cantons. The overall effect of revenue decentralization leads to fewer tax revenue 
but higher user charges. Crowley, G. R., & Sobel, R. S. (2011) examine the Leviathan rate-setting behavior, and 
a measure of the degree of intergovernmental interdependence, for municipal governments, school districts, and 
county governments. The study found that fiscal decentralization causing the intense competition among the 
government and also lowering tax rates. Stein (1999), explores the relationship between fiscal decentralization 
and government size in Latin America. The result show that decentralization tend to have larger governments 
size in, particularly occurred in the region have high vertical imbalance fund, transfers are discretional and the 
degree of borrowing autonomy of sub national governments is large. Liberati, P., & Sacchi, A. (2010) re-
examine the relationship between fiscal federalism and the size of local governments. The study testing the Tax 
Separation Hypothesis to which tax decentralization organized on tax bases used only by local governments 
would favor most the containment of local public expenditures. The result reveals that income taxes and general 
taxes on goods and services do not have impact on the government size. They concluded that no all taxes have 
negative impact on government size. While intergovernmental funds have positive impact on government size. 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
We used the following strategy model to examine the relationship between fiscal decentralization to government 
size: 
  0	  	
   	
    
 	 	 
 
Where: 
Zit= Government Size of i local government at time t, LIT= Local Tax Revenue, USCHA=user charge, 
GRANT= government grant, DEC= Decentralization revenue, and CONTV= control variable. Government Size 
measured both of revenue and spending side, with variable total revenue, expenditure, own source revenue and 
government grant variables as dependent variables. In this study we using transmission channel of local tax 
revenue, user charge, government grant and decentralization variables in examine of fiscal decentralization 
impact on government size. Appendix A and B explain the variables definition, the source of data and data 
statistical. Data period are used from 2004 to 2014, of 33 provinces. 
 
4. Result 
Table 2. explain the OLS regression method of decentralization fiscal and government size. The regression result 
shows that Local tax revenue (LTR) significant and positive sign to revenue, expenditure, owner resources and 
except for government Grant. Local tax revenue has positive correlation meaning that Local tax revenue will 
increase total local government revenue, and also government expenditure. USECHA is positive to OWNGDPR 
and GRANTGDPR. Government grant (GGRANT) statistically significant to all revenue categories and 
expenditures, but with negative sign indicating that government grant reduces local government revenue and all 
expenditure side. 
 
 
(1) 
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Table 2. Estimation Result with OLS model 
Variable RVGDRP EXPGDRP OWNGDRP GRANTGDPR 
LTR 0.276 (3.167) *** 0.266 (2.659) *** 0.049 (3.226) *** 0.015 (0.212) 
USECHA 0.031 (1.017) 0.026 (0.757) 0.012 (2.256) ** 0.056 (2.229) ** 
GGRANT -0.421 (-5.233) *** -0.419 (-4.538) *** -0.074 (-5.233) *** -0.164 (-2.442) ** 
DECREV -0.129 (-15.085) *** -0.141 (-14.332) *** 0.009 (6.071) *** -0.086 (-12.010) *** 
FRAG -0.006 (-0.233) -0.014 (-0.424) -0.009 (-1.923) *** -0.063 (-2.706) *** 
POPDIS 0.038 (0.338) -0.045 (-0.349) -0.043 (-2.214) ** 0.242 (2.582) ** 
EDUEXP -0.533 (-2.624) *** -0.457 (-1.955) * -0.064 (-1.805) * -0.256 (-1.510) 
HEAEXP 0.515 (2.873) *** 0.590 (2.867) *** 0.058 (1.847) * 0.062 (0.416) 
GROGDPR -0.030 (-2.092) ** -0.042 (-2.541) ** -0.006 (-2.323) ** -0.020 (-1.709) * 
UNEMPLO 0.152 (4.260) *** 0.186 (4.524) *** 0.003 (0.534) 0.115 (3.841) *** 
Obs 346 346 346 346 
R2 0.56 0.54 0.37 0.48 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level;*** Significant at the 1% level 
Revenue decentralization significant and negative sign to all revenues categories except for 
OWNGDPR. All transmission channel of fiscal decentralization associated significant to government size, this 
result supporting leviathan hypothesis that decentralization hamper government size. Fragmentation and 
population distribution were significant to OWNGDPR and GRANTGDPR, and no association with total 
revenue and total expenditure. Education expenditure and Health expenditure associated significant to revenue 
and expenditure categories, education spending is negative sign and reverses to health expenditure. Variable 
GDP growth and unemployment rate significant to government size proxies excerpt to OWNGDPR. 
Table 3. Random Effects (RE) and Fixed Effects (FE) Models 
Variable 
RVGDRP  EXPGDRP 
FE RE  FE RE 
LTR 0.199 (1.373) 0.161 (1.536)  0.153 (0.863) 0.137 (1.120) 
USECHA 0.009 (0.362) 0.010 (0.409)  0.019 (0.613) 0.017 (0.590) 
GGRANT -0.130 (-1.189) -0.246 (-2.604) ***  -0.142 (-1.064) -0.271 (-2.422) 
DECREV -0.064 (-3.554) *** -0.093 (-6.596) ***  -0.070 (-3.193) ** -0.107 (-6.585) *** 
FRAG -0.108 (-1.735) * -0.041 (-0.929)  -0.124 (-1.644) -0.044 (-0.874) 
POPDIS -0.223 (-0.474) -0.075 (-0.593)  -0.427 (-0.746) -0.130 (-0.890) 
EDUEXP -0.256 (-1.213) -0.342 (-1.710) *  -0.250 (-0.972) -0.341 (-1.421) 
HEAEXP 0.380 (2.008) * 0.465 (2.629) ***  0.505 (2.193) ** 0.593 (2.785) ** 
GROGDPR -0.023 (-2.126) * -0.020 (-1.884) *  -0.029 (-2.257) ** -0.026 (-2.053) ** 
UNEMPLO 0.136 (3.239) ** 0.145 (3.764) ***  0.205 (4.012) *** 0.210 (4.560) *** 
Obs 346 346  346 346 
R2 0.82 0.51  0.78 0.51 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
The OLS shortcoming model is ignore effect of individual and time dimension, where may be 
unobserved or omitted variable correlated with others variable. FE and RE model are presented to overcome the 
unobserved variable of individual and time dimension effect. Table.3 describe panel data regression result of FE 
and RE model. LTR significant to Own source revenue both of RE and FE but insignificant to total Revenue, 
expenditure and government grant. Local tax revenues cover the area of vehicle tax, title transfer tax, restaurant 
and hotel tax. The main tax income is vehicle tax , while the most potential tax selling tax, income tax were 
administer and levied by central government. Usher Charge insignificant to all revenue categories and 
expenditure, reflecting that user charge does not change government revenue and expenditure. The possibility 
reason of this can be explained that local governments do not rely on user charge instead of local tax revenue. 
Government grant significant at 1% significant level to revenue and own revenue with negative sign indicating 
that transfer balance from central balance decreasing local government grant. Decentralization revenue is 
significant to expenditure and all revenue categories, and have negative effect except own revenue variable with 
positive sign. In this case, decentralization revenue defines as revenue from local tax revenue, usher charge and 
others local revenue causing revenue and expenditure decrease. This result supporting leviathan hypothesis that 
fiscal decentralization reduce government size.  
Others control variable that significant to government size is unemployment rate. The effect sign of this 
variables expected negative sign instead of positive effect. GDP growth variable has significant and negative 
effect, except for own source revenue and government grant FE model. Health expenditure has positive effect to 
revenue expenditure and own revenue but insignificant to government grant. Education expenditure is 
insignificant to expenditure and government grant. 
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Table 3 extended 
Variable 
OWNGDPR   GRANTGDRP 
FE RE   FE RE 
LTR 0.077 (3.246) *** 0.043 (2.534) ** 0.013 (0.105) -0.021 (-0.244) 
USECHA 0.003 (0.679) 0.004 (1.081) 0.004 (0.192) 0.006 (0.288) 
GGRANT -0.017 (-0.929) -0.040 (-2.588) ** 0.086 (0.946) -0.027 (-0.350) 
DECREV 0.007 (2.371) ** 0.009 (3.713) *** -0.042 (-2.805) *** -0.062 (-5.360) *** 
FRAG -0.002 (-0.169) -0.005 (-0.737) -0.056 (-1.086) -0.057 (-1.566) 
POPDIS -0.015 (-0.196) -0.057 (-2.737) *** -0.291 (-0.746) 0.035 (0.332) 
EDUEXP -0.070 (-2.053) ** -0.079 (-2.437) ** -0.021 (-0.120) -0.093 (-0.565) 
HEAEXP 0.092 (2.995) *** 0.097 (3.375) *** 0.094 (0.598) 0.117 (0.797) 
GROGDPR -0.002 (-1.214) -0.002 (-1.275) 
 
-0.015 (-1.684) * -0.013 (-1.539) 
UNEMPLO 0.019 (2.827) *** 0.017 (2.667) *** 0.181 (5.186) *** 0.164 (5.141) *** 
Obs 346 346 346 346 
R2 0.77     0.29       0.78     0.42   
 
5. Conclusion 
The objective of this paper is to examine the association between fiscal decentralization and government size 
with transmission channel; local tax revenue, user charge, government grant and decentralization revenue. 
Government size variable are measured using total government revenue, total government spending, own source 
revenue and government grant revenue variables. There are 3 regression model of panel data used in this study, 
OLS, RE and FE model. With OLS method, local tax revenue and decentralization revenue are significant and 
positive to government size. Government transfer and decentralization revenue are significant and negative sin to 
government size. Different result showed by FE and RE method, local tax revenue insignificant to government 
size in term of revenue and expenditure. Local tax revenue contributes significantly to government revenue in 
sub national government, but this revenue does not have association with government size. However 
decentralization revenue and transfer from central government significant to government size. Control variables 
such as education and health spending, and unemployment rate are significant. Education negative sign, while 
health expenditure and unemployment are positive sign. As overall can be concluded that fiscal decentralization 
in term of decentralization revenue are significant and have negative sign to government size of local 
government, imply that fiscal decentralization in Indonesia support leviathan hypothesis.    
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Appendix A 
Variabel Definition 
Variables  Definition  Source 
REVGDPR Ratio of Total Revenue to GDP per province BPS and MoF 
EXPGDPR Ratio of Total Expenditure to GDP per prov BPS and MoF 
OWNSRGDPR Ratio of Own Source Revenue to GDP per prov BPS and MoF 
GRANTGDPR Ratio of Grant Fund to GDP per prov BPS and MoF 
LTR Local tax revenue on aggregate local revenue BPS and MoF 
USECHA User charge on aggregate user charge BPS and MoF 
GGRANT Goverment Grant on aggregate goverment grant BPS and MoF 
DECREV Decentralization Revenue (Local tax revenue, BPS and MoF 
FRAG Number of distric fragmentation BPS and MoF 
POPDIS Population distribution rate BPS and MoF 
EDUEXP Education expenditure BPS and MoF 
HEAEXP Health expenditure  BPS and MoF 
GROGDPR Growth of Gross Domestic Product Regional BPS and MoF 
UNEMPLO Unemployment rate BPS and MoF 
 Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS), Ministry of Finance (MoF) 
 
Appendix B 
Statistic Description of  Data 
Variable Mean Max Min Std. Dev. 
REVGDPR 3.473471 17.5436 0.8601 2.781434 
EXPGDPR 3.983931 18.224 0 3.124492 
OWNSRGDPR 1.015861 2.359 0.286 0.40786 
GRANTGDPR 1.903076 14.8121 0.2081 2.125283 
DECREV 39.9117 77.4239 2.6082 19.41893 
LTR 3.166408 31.4039 0.0757 5.191778 
USECHA 3.178889 68.8079 0.0011 7.321182 
GGRANT 3.120984 25.2766 0.8536 3.628311 
FRAG 11.88728 29 1 7.115732 
POPDIS 3.164971 18.25 0.31 4.413936 
EDUEXP 3.143775 16.0416 0.3158 3.181947 
HEAEXP 3.135053 14.374 0.4607 2.857398 
GROGDPR 14.02922 75.56 -21.12 7.163223 
UNEMPLO 7.317865 17.6245 1.6374 3.262211 
   Source:own calculations 
 
